A Tale of Four Elections: Central Europe September 1997-September 1998 by Fitzmaurice, John
www.ssoar.info
A Tale of Four Elections: Central Europe September
1997-September 1998
Fitzmaurice, John
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Fitzmaurice, J. (2000). A Tale of Four Elections: Central Europe September 1997-September 1998. Sociologický
časopis / Czech Sociological Review, 8(1), 93-101. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53221
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  
93 
A Tale of Four Elections: Central Europe  
September 1997-September 1998 
 
JOHN FITZMAURICE* 
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium 
Abstract: This article analyses and compares the four elections held between Sep-
tember 1997 and September 1998 in the four ‘Visegrad’ countries (Poland, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia), all of which led to a change of government. It 
concentrates on the effect of these elections on the development of party systems, 
seeking to identify trends across the region. It notes that the key issue was the re-
structuring of the centre-right. It concludes that party systems remain more unstable 
than might have been thought and that the process of restructuring is far from over. 
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Introduction 
In the year between September 1997 and September 1998, general elections took place in 
all four core central European states: Poland (September 1997), Hungary (May 1998), the 
Czech Republic (June 1998) and Slovakia (September 1998). All four elections were 
important in that they led to some form of ‘alternance’. All were also important in terms 
of the evolution of the party system. Taken together, they point up a number of important 
political trends across the region, as it stands on the threshold of EU membership, possi-
bly even within the next parliamentary terms, not least in relation to the development of 
the party systems. Let us first look at the issues and outcome in each of the four countries, 
before drawing together the threads across the region. 
1. Poland 
Between 1993 and 1997, Poland was governed by a coalition of ‘old system parties’, the 
SLD, based on the reform communists and the trade unions, and the PPL (Peasant Party). 
Electoral reform and divisions on the right, in large part deriving from the conflict sur-
rounding Lech Walęsa, had meant that at the 1993 election, almost 30% of the vote went 
unrepresented because it was split between numerous small right of centre parties. In-
deed, only one right of centre party achieved any parliamentary representation. This gave 
the SLD and PPL an overwhelming and unrepresentative majority in the Sejm. Continu-
ing splits on the right after 1993 further ensured the defeat of Walęsa’s bid to win a sec-
ond term at the 1995 presidential election and the election of Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
(SLD) as President, concentrating all executive power in the hands of the SLD. Thus, the 
SLD and its allies controlled the Sejm, government and presidency [Webb 1992, Weso-
lowski 1996]. 
At last, this concentration of power in the hands of the left and the repeated lesson 
that division meant defeat, did spur the parties of the right towards unity and though the 
road was thorny, it led in the end to the formation of the Solidarity Electoral Alliance 
(AWS) and the coalition with UW, bringing the various parties of the Solidarność family 
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back together again in government after the 1997 election. This process of reunification 
was difficult, complex, indeed often Byzantine. Its success was by no means certain and 
its progress strewn with obstacles. Even now, after two years in government, AWS re-
mains a very fragile and combustible plant. This conflict continued even after the eclipse 
of Lech Walęsa, who was at one and the same time the right’s best asset and the main 
obstacle to its unity. There were several different and competing game plans for uniting 
the right, each with a different leadership centre. The first not very successful efforts were 
launched already before the 1995 presidential elections. These were no more than loose 
platforms or alliances of small and medium sized parties, mostly then outside Parliament. 
While registering some success at the 1994 local elections, these alliances were unable to 
meet the much stricter requirements of unity, discipline and at least minimum political 
coherence posed by the pressure of a two-round presidential election. There were two 
such alliances: the centre-right Pact for Poland, formed in June 1994 by five Christian 
democratic, traditionalist, pro-Walęsa parties and, secondly, the more right-leaning Elev-
enth of November Agreement between five other, smaller libertarian, free market and 
more eurosceptic parties. Neither had much impact at the 1995 presidential election 
[Fitzmaurice 1997]. 
The 1995 presidential election, at which Walęsa was defeated narrowly in the sec-
ond round, eliminated him as a factor of unity, or more often division, on the right. It also 
saw the anti- or non-Solidarność conservative former premier, Jan Olszewski, emerge as 
a potential unifier of the right. He had ‘profiled’ himself, through his presidential cam-
paign, scoring a surprising and respectable 6.5%. He used this as a springboard for this 
evocatively-entitled Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP). For a time, ROP 
seemed likely to become the pole of unification of the right, rising to 15% in the polls and 
sucking in several smaller groupings. The battle was then joined. The centre-right ele-
ments of the former Solidarność parties realised that they must react to this development 
or be sidelined. The Solidarność trade union and party under its dynamic leader, Krzak-
lewski, reacted and acted. Division and lethargy was stamped out. Solidarność put its 
muscle behind the creation of an electoral coalition that could challenge SLD and find 
more centrist coalition partners, such as UW or possibly PPL. UW was preferable on 
economic issues and PPL on social matters. Against PPL was the fact that it was an ‘old 
system’ party. In favour of UW was its membership of the wider historical Solidarność 
family. 
Soon, the Solidarność electoral alliance (AWS) pulled ahead and drew in the re-
maining independent groups on the right. It achieved both greater critical mass and 
greater credibility as a possible alternative government. By the time of the election, ROP 
had been marginalised. AWS won 33.8% and 201 seats to 5.56% and six seats for ROP. 
No other grouping on the right won seats in Parliament, now slimmed down to a mere 
five parties (ROP-AWS-UW-PPL-SLD). 
On the left, as in Hungary, SLD emerged from four years of power in good shape. 
Its share of the vote even increased to 27.1% (from 20.4% in 1993). This post-communist 
party has consolidated itself as the main party of the left and the only leftist pole in a two-
party or two-bloc system. Again, as in Hungary, the PPL, its smaller coalition partner 
took the heat, reducing to a more long-term tenable size. 
The western ‘dream coalition’ of pro-European modernisers (SLD and UW), on the 
model of the Hungarian 1994-98 MSZP-SDS coalition, was neither arithmetically nor 
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politically possible in Poland. UW was therefore relieved of this difficult choice, being 
drawn into a centre-right coalition with national conservatives as the only possible coali-
tion. The future alignment of parties in Poland still remains open. Can AWS consolidate 
into a real party or will it split again? Will UW permanently gravitate to the centre-right, 
or can it retain its long-term independence and act as a liberal, centre, balancing party like 
the German FDP? Finally, what of PPL? From the substance of its positions it should 
align itself with AWS. Can it now do this, or will history still prevent that? 
2. Hungary 
In the first, freely elected Parliament (1990-94) [“Hungary” 1990], Hungary was gov-
erned by a three-party centre-right coalition (MDF-KNDP-FKGP) led by Prime Minister 
Antall (MDF). The election had been less a plebiscite on the old system than a competi-
tion between two parties from the opposition, MDF and the liberal SDS. MDF won the 
contest, often with second-round MSZP (former communist) votes. The MDF-led gov-
ernment was characterised by splits (in both MDF and FKGP) and by failure to meet the 
expectations of the people both in terms of economic reform and democratic renewal 
[Fitzmaurice 1997]. 
The key question was, which of the three opposition parties – SDS, FIDESZ or 
MSZP – would emerge as the alternative pole? All three led in the polls at various stages. 
Eventually MSZP, under Guyla Horn, emerged as the main contender. It won an absolute 
majority in 1994 [Fitzmaurice 1995a], but preferred to form a coalition with SDS, giving 
it broader political legitimisation and the two-thirds constitutional majority in Parliament. 
This ‘dream ticket’ of pro-EU, pro-NATO modernisers, committed to economic reform, 
was a good government, but the improved macro-economic figures and its foreign policy 
successes (NATO membership, opening of EU, accession negotiations, settlements with 
Slovakia and Romania…) did not produce a ‘feel good factor’ among the electorate, 
while new problems such as crime and renewed difficulties over the Danube Dam project 
took centre stage. Above all, SDS got itself marginalised in the coalition, bore responsi-
bility for some key areas of relative failure, such as law and order, and failed to sell the 
coalition, its success and SDS’s own contribution to its electorate. SDS therefore plum-
meted (like PPL in Poland) from 19.3% in 1990 to a near catastrophic 7.88% in 1998. It 
led in only two constituencies and could only secure 24 seats overall. MSZP, on the other 
hand, stabilised at 32.25%, only 0.7% down on 1994. Due to the electoral system, the 
new unity of the right and the weak solidarity with SDS, it could only secure 134 seats, 
fewer than FIDESZ, despite leading FIDESZ in its share of the vote in the first round. 
The same share of the vote gave 134 seats in 1998 against 209 in 1994, similar to the 
position of SLD in Poland. As in Poland, though MSZP has secured its position as a 
strong left-wing pole and the only opposition to the centre-right. For SDS, the best hope 
is to become a small, balancing liberal party ‘making’ governments. The worst scenario – 
just as likely – is for it to be pulled apart, split and become swallowed by FIDESZ and 
MSZP. 
As in Poland, the determining issue in the 1998 election was the restructuring of 
the right. Already before the 1994 election, FIDESZ had signalled a shift to the right after 
failing to reach a pact with SDS to form a liberal centre. However it was too soon, as both 
MDF and FKGP considered themselves better placed to organise that restructuring. Given 
FIDESZ’s poor showing in 1994 (8.02%) and its continuing internal debates, this was not 
unreasonable. FIDESZ then embarked on a wide-ranging policy review and listening 
Czech Sociological Review, VIII, (1/2000) 
96 
exercise, coupled with appeals for unity of the opposition. These strategies paid off. FI-
DESZ rose in the polls and dominated both media and expert debate. The populist cam-
paigns of Mr. Torgyán, FKGP leader, were soon punctured and FIDESZ took over the 
leading position in the opposition camp. 
By the time of the election, MDF had already ceded leadership to FIDESZ. While 
still seeking to win enough votes to be represented in Parliament via county and national 
lists, MDF agreed on some joint candidates with FIDESZ already from the first round and 
otherwise automatic withdrawal at the second round in favour of FIDESZ elsewhere. 
Less openly, KDNP had adopted the same approach. Neither won 5% of the vote. FKGP 
did not give up in advance. It could expect to win 5%, and in many rural areas it could 
expect to lead in the first round, as indeed it did. Its 13.77% (third place), an increase on 
1994, and its numerous well-placed candidates, as well as the charismatic if erratic lead-
ership of Torgyán made it a factor to reckon with. FIDESZ knew it would need FKGP but 
did not wish to offer a flank to MSZP and SDS by negotiating any deal with Torgyán in 
advance. It therefore agreed to withdraw all its candidates unconditionally in favour of 
better placed opposition candidates. These were, in practice, almost all FKGP candidates. 
It called on FKGP to do the same but refused to negotiate as Torgyán demanded. It was a 
poker game. Eighty-one FKGP candidates were withdrawn and fifteen FIDESZ candi-
dates pulled out. No talks took place before the election, but once the election was over, 
Victor Orbán made it clear that FKGP was his priority partner. No talks were held with 
the only other right-wing party that won seats, István Csurka’s far right MIEP. It was not 
needed and its image would have tarnished FIDESZ. 
Almost two years on, the process of the restructuring of the right is still not com-
plete. KDNP has ceased to operate as a genuine independent party. MDF, though it had 
become a virtual satellite of FIDESZ at the election, has since shown limited signs of 
renewal and revival, though none that seriously challenge FIDESZ. The coalition has 
held. FIDESZ remained the leading party in the polls, ahead of MSZP until six months 
ago, when it was overtaken by MSZP. Neither FKGP nor MIEP at present seem a threat 
to FIDESZ, but they may bide their time and find opportunities. The fate of FKGP re-
mains unclear. However, Central European party systems remain volatile. FIDESZ 
should not forget the fate of MDF. 
3. The Czech Republic 
Developments in Poland and Hungary show some parallels. Superficially, that is much 
less true of the two states formed out of the former Czechoslovakia, although at least in 
the Czech Republic some of the same issues have arisen. The problem of restructuring the 
right in the post-transition has also become salient in the Czech Republic. Not only did 
the social liberals in OF lose the battle for the unity of Czechoslovakia, they also lost the 
battle over the pace of reform. After the 1992 election the country was divided in a “vel-
vet divorce” and a radical centre-right coalition, dominated by Václav Klaus and his 
ODS, came to power, committed to pushing through a thoroughgoing market reform. His 
coalition partners (KDU-ČSL and ODA), were unable to control Klaus and felt them-
selves manipulated and steamrollered. For ODA, the commitment of ODS to market prin-
ciples was not always sufficiently coherent when it conflicted with that party’s clientelist 
interests. KDU-ČSL was concerned that the social and moral dimension was ignored in a 
single-minded commitment to economic reform [Fitzmaurice 1997: 127-139]. 
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As long as there was economic growth, low unemployment in most areas and the 
‘downside’ of economic reforms in terms of serious corruption and the creation of losers 
as well as winners remained hidden, it was possible to ignore these criticisms. By the 
1996 elections though, voters fired a warning shot across Klaus’s bows. He had to make 
concessions both to the ČSSD, the victors of the election, quadrupling their vote to within 
striking distance of ODS and to his KDU-ČSL coalition partners. When the economic 
crisis broke in 1997, Klaus’s critics all united, including President Havel, the opposition, 
KDU-ČSL and an internal opposition in ODS, forcing his resignation. This internal oppo-
sition formed a new party to contest the 1998 elections. Called Unie svobody (US), delib-
erately copying the Polish Freedom Union (UW), it aimed (unlike UW) to become the 
main pole of the centre-right as ODS lost support and ODA imploded. It could hope to 
take support from ODS, ODA and KDU-ČSL. However, Klaus and ODS, once in opposi-
tion, after a temporary no-party cabinet had been formed proved resilient and moved back 
into the lead in the polls during the campaign, easily remaining the largest party on the 
centre right. 
The centre-left remained stable throughout the Parliament. No centre force 
emerged. No party to the left of ČSSD represented a serious challenge. ČSSD’s poll re-
sults fluctuated and as the election neared it seemed unlikely to achieve 30% as some 
1997 polls had suggested. It was, though, with the split in ODS, likely to emerge as the 
largest party even with no better result than in 1996. It was widely seen as the front run-
ner and likely government party after the elections. The communists (KSČM) level of 
support remained stable and no fundamental change in the nature of the party took place. 
However, unlike 1996, it now emphasised its common ground with ČSSD, desire for a 
change and offered external support, though admitting that ČSSD would not welcome 
KSČM support. As in Slovakia, an unknown populist party; based on the grievances of 
losers in reforms; especially pensioners, mushroomed from its 3.1% in 1996 to poll rat-
ings of 11%, taking votes across the boards from KSČM, ČSSD and KDU-ČSL. Its pos-
sible entry into Parliament posed a real threat to ČSSD, which might then be unable to 
put together a majority coalition. 
In the event, ČSSD won 32.3%, an unexpectedly good result. ODS came in second 
with 27.7%, also an excellent result. The breakaway US failed to make the decisive 
breakthrough it had hoped for, winning only 8.6%. The KSČM won 11.3%, a small in-
crease, the Republicans (3.9%) and the pensioners’ party (3.06%) failed to win parlia-
mentary representation. The overall right/left balance had changed little since 1996. 
The ČSSD victory was difficult to turn into an effective governing coalition. As no 
open co-operation with the KSČM was possible, only two majority coalitions were possi-
ble: a ČSSD-led ČSSD+KDU-ČSL+US coalition (112 seats) or an ODS-led ODS+KDU-
ČSL+US coalition. Neither Zeman nor Klaus could build a majority coalition. The result 
was a functional grand coalition formalised in an ‘opposition agreement’. ČSSD formed a 
minority government under Zeman as Prime Minister, with Klaus taking the important 
position of Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and with ODS giving its support to the 
government. The two parties, with together a “constitutional majority” (137 seats/200) 
plan to change the electoral system towards a majority system. Defended as the only al-
ternative and as a contribution to stability, this de facto grand coalition has been severely 
criticised. It has created a weak minority government that cannot be removed, as under 
the opposition agreement ODS is committed to not supporting a motion of no-confidence 
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during the life of this Parliament in a period where pro-active government is needed. It 
has frozen further evolution of the party system on both left and right. 
4. Slovakia 
Slovakia is the most singular or atypical of the four cases. The party system remains the 
most volatile. Party discipline and party organisation are still weak. More than elsewhere 
in the region the key political cleavages are issues of national identity and relationship to 
the old system rather than western style cleavages. The developments elsewhere in Cen-
tral Europe, tending towards a more ‘modern’ western type of party system, characterised 
by limited electoral competition between two broad blocs of the centre-right and the cen-
tre-left, have been much more limited in Slovakia. Attempts to ‘modernise’ the Slovak 
political system remain fairly unsuccessful. Two broad camps have emerged in Slovakia, 
but not based on left-right cleavages: a nationalist, old system camp and a modernising, 
internationalist camp [Bútora et al. 1999]. 
The dominant personality in Slovak politics since 1990 has been Vladimír Mečiar 
[Fitzmaurice 1997: 137-143]. He was originally Prime Minister of Slovakia within the 
Czechoslovak Federation, heading a VPN-Christian Democrat coalition. In the turmoil 
over the future of the Federation he was deposed, only to return in 1992 at the head of the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), a nationalist movement that broke out of 
VPN and, because of its more cautious position on economic liberalisation, was able to 
appeal to voters who felt themselves to be losers from reform. In alliance with the pro-
independence SNS, Mečiar’s HZDS called the bluff of the dominant Czech party that 
won the 1992 election on the Czech side, Václav Klaus’s ODS. With Mečiar, HZDS and 
the Slovak National Party (SNS) in control in Slovakia and ODS and Václav Klaus domi-
nant in the Czech Republic, separation became inevitable. Mečiar remained in power in 
the independent Slovak Republic after 1993. His arrogant and authoritarian political style 
and his approach to modernisation caused strains and eventually splits within HZDS. 
Eventually the combined opposition, HZDS dissidents (later DUS) under Moravčík, and 
the Hungarian parties combined to pass a motion of censure. A modernising coalition 
assumed power, but was unable to retain its majority at the election six months later in 
September 1994. Apart from the high political cost of co-operation with the Hungarian 
parties – a problem specific to Slovakia – the incomplete transformation and modernisa-
tion of the post-communist Democratic Left Party (SDL) was a serious problem. Its posi-
tion on future relations with HZDS was never unequivocal. Inside the party its 
participation in the coalition with the centre right was a cause of conflict. A breakaway 
faction united with trade union activists from the old system to form the ZRS (Slovak 
Workers Party). This demagogic party won a surprising 7.3% and then, predictably, 
formed a nationalist-old system coalition with HZDS and SNS. Mečiar returned like a 
political Houdini [Fitzmaurice 1995b]. 
During the 1994-1998 legislature, the coalition held together despite severe clashes 
between the partners over Mečiar’s style and over the approach to privatisation and media 
policy issues. As the legislature moved to a close, the coalition parties were well behind 
in the polls, but no-one would lightly predict the defeat of Mečiar. He is a survivor. The 
issues he represents have strong resonance with Slovak voters. The more embattled and 
condemned from the outside he is, the more he is able to play the strings of Slovak na-
tionalism. Even the long-running conflict with the President of the Republic did not dent 
Mečiar’s position. On the contrary, he was able to assume the powers of the presidency, 
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in addition to those of prime minister, when Michal Kováč’ mandate expired in March, 
though these were later devolved to the president of Parliament. 
As elsewhere, the central issue was the restructuring of the centre-right opposition. 
In Slovakia the problem was compounded by the fact that a credible alternative majority 
would need to include the left-leaning SDL and the Hungarian parties. No other grouping 
could expect to win a majority. The KDH and the DUS had co-operated well, as the hard 
core of the Moravčík coalition and they had also co-operated in opposing efforts by 
HZDS to impeach President Kováč to control the Slovak media, and to maintain a west-
ern orientation of Slovak foreign policy both in regard to NATO and EU membership. 
The Mečiar-led government was ostensibly in favour of both, but did little to ensure that 
Slovakia would be included in the first wave. Indeed, for political reasons, it was ex-
cluded from both. The government sabotaged the referendum on NATO, having failed to 
campaign for a Yes vote. The opposition had at the same time tried to promote a constitu-
tional initiative providing for direct election of the president, which was again sabotaged 
by the government. 
Catalysed by these government actions, the ‘Blue Coalition’, later the Slovak De-
mocratic Coalition (SDK), emerged. It included the KDH, DUS and three smaller parties 
including the Greens and Social Democrats. It was a ‘rainbow coalition’ extending from 
right to left. It was formed for pragmatic reasons. Only such a block could hope to be-
come the largest party and so immediately be charged with forming a government, pre-
venting Mečiar from seeking to break opposition unity to stay in power. The obvious 
problem was the internal cohesion of SDK, its still ambiguous relations with SDL and the 
need for co-operation with the Hungarian parties. SDK held up well and with 26.5% fin-
ished close behind HZDS (27.1%). 
The emergence from nowhere of the new populist, anti-Mečiar Party of Civic Un-
derstanding (SOP) led by the charismatic Mayor of Košice (Slovakia’s second city), Mr. 
Schuster, showed that the party system remained volatile. New parties could enter like 
shooting stars as media creations. At one point SOP was credited with 18% in the polls, 
but ended with only 8.1% – still a significant result for a ‘virtual’ party. It probably took 
most votes from disillusioned voters in the Mečiar camp, preventing HZDS from retain-
ing a sufficient critical mass of support. 
As it was, SDL (14.8%) did well, though it did not break through its 15% target, 
making it, rather than SOP, the new king-maker. The four opposition groupings (SDK, 
SDL, SOP and the Hungarians – SMK) won 58.1% and 93 seats (out of 150), giving them 
not only a majority but even a constituent three-fifths majority, and the majority needed 
to elect a new president (vacant since March). Even without the Hungarians or SOP there 
would be a majority. A four-party coalition of all the opposition parties (SDK, SDL, SOP, 
SMK) was formed [Fitzmaurice 1999]. 
The election was more in the nature of the founding election that Slovakia had 
never had. A rainbow alliance of internationalist modernisers confronted a nationalist, 
statist, inward-looking coalition of old political forces. The victory of the opposition was 
a new start. This victory was confirmed by the defeat of Mečiar in the May 1999 presi-
dential election by SOP leader Schuster. Now the restructuring of the party system may 
be able to begin. HZDS may split and SDK may become a people’s party of the centre-
right. However, the future of SOP is uncertain. 
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5. Trends across the Region 
There are signs that the party systems have not settled as much as appeared to be the case 
at the previous round of elections [Delwitt and Dewaele 1998]. Those elections saw con-
siderable new entry and meltdown among parties that appeared well established. It seems 
likely that this process may continue for some time to come before a greater degree of 
stability in the party system is achieved. Overall, these elections leave the clear impres-
sion that party systems and individual parties are vulnerable and have set down few deep 
roots. It should however be said that this applies less to the left part of the political spec-
trum, where one single dominant, relatively well-rooted party has emerged as the stan-
dard bearer of the left pole, and hence is a potential government party. This clearly 
applies to both MSZP in Hungary and SLD in Poland, although they lost power. They 
face no challengers on the left and have the largest or second largest share of the vote. 
These elections were less defeats for MSZP and SLD than for the coalition partners. 
ČSSD had a challenger to its left, but the KSČM has been tamed, offering itself simply as 
a potential junior partner to ČSSD. Slovakia is the odd man out. Whilst the SLD does 
dominate the left, it does not represent an alternative pole. At best, it can play a king-
making role, as it came to do after the 1998 election. 
The central problem of this round of elections was the complex process of realign-
ment on the right. The emergence of dominant parties in a centre-right pole can be seen as 
part of a wider process, in which political systems more closely align themselves with 
western models. There is now a clear left and right pole, each organised around a domi-
nant party in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. A centre-right opposition pole has 
also emerged in Slovakia, though it needs to ally with the ‘modernising’ SLD to obtain a 
majority. 
A pattern has emerged of ‘alternation’. The party or parties in power have system-
atically been penalised by the electorate. Parties in power, whether on the left as in Hun-
gary and Poland, or on the right as in the Czech Republic, were pro-European 
modernisers, less by ideological commitment than by force of circumstances. This does 
not mean that there was a rejection of modernisation or of European integration on the 
part of the electorate. Indeed, one obvious general trend is the general acceptance of 
modernisation as a political objective. Political debate is, with some exceptions, restricted 
to the method not the objective itself. Politicians need to demonstrate their capacity to 
manage modernisation effectively without tolerating too much corruption or creating too 
many losers. The losers in the electorate punished the parties in power for failing to create 
a feel-good factor. The pendulum swung in all four countries. In Poland and Hungary 
from left to right; in the Czech Republic to the left; in Slovakia from populism to modern-
ism. This confirms the fragility of the party system. 
An important trend to emerge across the region has been concern about governabil-
ity. Voters have looked to reward parties that have provided or look likely to provide 
effective government. Concern about corruption, economic crime and security has 
emerged strongly in all four countries. Parties have been obliged to emphasise team work, 
underline leadership in depth and project softer images. Both the Czech ČSSD and ODS 
gave less emphasis to their respective leaders Zeman and Klaus than in 1996. Both did 
well. In Hungary, both MSZP and FIDESZ did well. SDS and FKGP did less well, as 
they did not project strongly on a competence scale. In Poland, UW, LSD had good elec-
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tions alongside AWS. PPL, the junior coalition partner in the SLD-led coalition, did 
badly, projecting weakly by most competence measures. 
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